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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
VERN H. PETERSEN and
GEORGIA PETERSE~, husband and
wife; REED L. PETERSEN and
ETHEL L. PETERSEN
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
JULE COMBE, JR., and
JULE COMBE, SR.,
Defendants and Appellants.

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The Plaintiffs brought this action to restrain the Defendants from interfering with the use of a road known as
4600 South Street in Weber County, Utah. The Plaintiffs
further sought a restraining order requiring the Defendants
to remove signs posted on said road which indicated that it
was a private road, with a further statement that the road
came to a "dead end" and that no trespassing thereon would
be allowed. The defendants counterclaimed, alleging that
the road was a private road and could restrict the use thereof
by other landowners
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Weber County, by the Hon.
Charles G. Cowley, Judge, adjudicated that the road in question was a public road, and restrained the Defendants from
interfering with the use thereof.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiffs and respondents seek to have the lower
Court Judgment rendered herein, affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Regarding the statement of facts as elicited in appellants'
brief, respondents deny Lhat the original road did not connect
with Harrison Boulevard, as stated on Page 2, and further,
that the signs mentioned on Page 3 were in existence, as
indicated. Further, the prep01:derance of the evidence indicated that the public had used the road, without objection
from the Defendants, and further, that the County had definitely maintained the road. The facts in support of respondents' contentions are as follows:
In 1965, the Plaintiffs had a subdivision dedicated and
approved in Ogden City, known as "The Knollwood Estates"
subdivision (TR 91, lines 7-12). This subdivision was planned
for approximately seventy building lots for residential construction. At the time of the trial hearing five homes had
been constructed in said subdivision and were all occupied
(TR 91, lines 29-30). The subject road is the only road that
gives any access to Plaintiffs' subdivision. (TR 93, line 4).
The subject road is further the only road that led to the Farrell home, Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest for more than
25 years. (TR 93, line 6).

There are other homes that use 4600 South Street as
access to their property. Bertha Martinet (TR 41, line 12)
testified that she had lived in her home for 50 years or more,
that the road has been in existence for 50 years or more,
and that this is the only access road to her property (TR 41,
lines 14-19). She further testified that "a lot of people go
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over it" (TR 41, line 2 2) and that no one has ever been
stopped from using the road (TR 41, line 24). Defendant
Jule Combe, Sr. further testified that he offered to give the
road to the County in 1945 if they would grade and maintain
it (TR 140, line 30), (TR 141, lines 1-9). Defendant Jule
Combe, Sr. further testified that Weber County equipment
was used to construct the road (TR 141, line 11), as follows:
"Did they use a County grader to put it in?" Answer: "Yes."
Defendant Combe, Sr. further stated, by his own admission,
that l\1r. Farrell, Plaintiffs' prior owner, had used the road
since 1945 (TR 143, line 2). Defendant Jule Combe, Sr.
further admitted that the County had scrapers on the road
every year since 1945 to plow the snow and maintain same
!TR 143, lines 25-30) and (TR 144, lines 2-7), and at his
request, (TR 144, line 16) "You wanted the County to maintain this road, didn't you?" Answer, "Yes." Defendant
Jule Combe, Sr. further testified that for the last 10 years he
ha<l not stopped anyone from using the road (TR 145, line 17),
however he did testify that more than 10 years ago he attempted to stop "lovers'' from driving over the road but they
didn't pay any attention to him (TR 145, line 11).
Plaintiffs' witness, David Wadsworth, an employee of
Ogden City, testified that Ogden City has a reservoir east of
the Plaintiffs' property and that he has used the road every
day to maintain the reservoir and has never been stopped
from using same. He further stated that this is the only road
that gives Ogden City access to said reservoir (TR 9, line 14
and line 30). Plaintiffs' witness Florence J. Harris, testified
that Jim Farrell had used the road for more than 33 years
and that she personally had travelled over the road for the
la~t 33 years (TR 16, lines 29-30). Her frequency of use
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apparently was two to three times a month (TR 1 7, line 17 1.
Anna l\lartinet, another owner of a home on 4600 South
Street, testified that she has lived in her residence, off and
on, about 50 years (TR 20, line 17). She also testified that
the road had been in use by other people for the last SO
years (TR 20, line 21). Her testimony further stated that
there had not been any gates across the road for the last 50
years (TR 21, line 4). Her testimony further indicated that
the public had never been stopped from using the road in
the last 50 years (TR 2 2, lines 1-3), and verified the county
maintenance of the road (TR 23, line 20). On cross-examination, Anna l\lartinet further testified that the road had become heavily travelled in the last 8 or 10 years (TR 2 7, line
30 (TR 28, line 1).
Kathy Preece testified that she owns a home in the
Knollwood Estates Subdivision (TR 34, line 16). Her testimony further indicated that she had never been restricted
in the use of the road (TR 3 5, lines 7-9). Action was also
taken by the Weber County Commission wherein a resolution
was unanimously passed declaring that the road in question
was a public road because of the usage by the public in exces'
of 10 years. This resolution is stated in Plaintiffs' Exhiit "C".
Plaintiffs' sixth witness was a Mr. Charles Hansaker. He
stated that he moved into the Farrell home, on Plaintiffs'
property, in 1941(TR47, lines 18-19). He further indicated
that 4600 South Street was the only road to the Farrell home
that he was renting (TR 47, lines 23-29). He lived in the
Farrell home from 1941 until the fall of 1952 (TR 48, line'
18-20). He then moved back in the Farrell home in 1952
and lived there until 1956 (TR 48, lines 20-25). Altogether
he lived in the Farrell home 2 2 years (TR 49, line 3 ). He
further stated that during these 2 2 years the public had never
4
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been restricted from using the road (TR 49, lines 11-16).
Regarding the "no trespassing" sign, his testimony indicates
that it was first put up three or four years ago (TR SO, lines
22-24 ). ?\Ir. Hansaker further stated that the Weber Basin
Water District had used this road since 1956 or 1957 (TR 56,
lines 16-18), with the Forest Service, and the South Ogden
Water Company (TR 56, line 30). He further indicated that
County plowed, scraped, and maintained the road once every
two months (TR 5, lines 20-29). He further stated that he,
himself, had called the County a dozen times to "plow the
snow", starting in 1941 (TR 59, lines 22-24).
Plaintiffs' seventh witness was Mr. A. E. Benning. His
testimony stated that his home also was on 4600 South Street,
east of the Combe property (TR 61, lines 7-28). Further, he
:itated that this is the only road to his property (TR 62,
lines 8-10)). He bought his property in 1954 (TR 62, line
12 ). Mr. Benning further indicated that he did not know of
the public being restricted in the use of the road since 19 54
1TR 1 7, line 2 2). Tl~e next Plaintiffs' witness was Mr. Elmer

L. Burton. He testified that he owned real estate soutth of
A. E. Benning's property (TR 76, lines 1-2). He further
stated that the public had the full use of the road for the last
25 years (TR 76, line 20). His testimony further indicated
that this was the road that gave him access to his property
(TR 76, lines 2 6-30). He furtiler indicated that the Burch
Creek Water Company used this road (TR 77, line 16). He
further indicated that the first time he saw a "no trespassing"
sign was two or three years ago (TR 80, line 10).
Plaintiffs' next witness was Jim Kostoff, an employee
of the Weber Basin \Yater Conservancy District. He testified
that the Weber Basin \Vater District constructed reservoirs
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m an area south of the Plaintiffs' property. He further described "Exhiit R", showing the location of the reservoirs
and air valves, etc., which must be maintained by said district
(TR 112, lines 27-30) and (TR 113, lines 1-11). He further
testified that these facilities required inspection at least two
or three times a week during the summer (TR 113, lines
14-15). Mr Kostoff further indicated that 4600 South Street
was the only road available to get access to the Weber Basin
facilities (TR 113, lines 24-26). He further testified that
he first used the road in 1956 (TR 115, line 56) and that
he had never been restricted from said usage (TR 115, line
18), and that he had travelled it himself 30 to 40 times (TR
115, lines 28-29). An employee of the Mountain States Telephone Company, James L. Patterson, testified that his company had a reflector located on the foothills, which was constructed in 1962. He further indicated that it was necessary
to travel 4600 South Street to get to their facilities, which
were inspected at least once a year (TR 120, lines 11-13),
(TR 120, line 30), (TR 121, line 1).
The next witness was a Udell Gardner, an employee of
the Utah Fish and Game Department. He indicated that the
Fish and Game Department owned Section 19, which lies just
south and a little east of the Knollwood Estates Subdivision
(TR 123, lines 20-21). He further indicated that to his own
knowledge the Fish and Game Department had travelled 4600
South Street to get to their property since 1960 and probably
before that (TR 12 3, lines 24, 2 5, 26). He further indicated
that the Fish and Game Department had never been restricted
in their use of this road (TR 15, line 17). Plaintiff Vern H.
Petersen, testified that there are 71 lots altogether in the
Knollwood Etates Subdivision, and that the value of the
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homes that have been constructed have been approximately
~30,000 !TR 127, lines 14-17). Plaintiffs' exhibit "A" to "R"
iurther show the extent of the use of the road, the opinion of
the \V eber County Surveyor's office, and that this roadway
was described in prior deeds, beginning in 1907. Jule Combe,
Jr .. the most militant Defendant, just purchased his property
in 1961, and moved into his home in 1962 (TR 156, lines
17-20) and only owns approximately 300 feet, of the total
length of approximately 5,000 feet of the road.
ARGUMENT
Vtah Statute 27-12-89, enacted in 1963, which is identical to the former Statute of 27-1-2, which was originally
enacted in 1898, provides as follows:
PUBLIC CONSTITUTING DEDICATION.
A highway shall br deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten
year.

Of the 16 witnesses, the only witness that claimed that
there had not been unrestricted use of the road for 10 years
or more was Jule Combe,

Jr.

Anna Martinet, and Bertha l\.Iartinet, who have used 4600
South Street as access to their residence, testified that it had
been used by them for at least 50 years. Mr. Hansaker, who
rented the home on the Plaintiffs' property, and used 4600
South Street as the only access to his home, testified that he
hact used the road without restriction for a total of 2 2 years
~inre 1941. If the Defendants were allowed the close the
roa<l, or restrict the use, then any of the other 40 to 50 landowners who have their homes on 4600 South Street, or use
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this road, would also have the same right, which could deny
access to all owners. Approximately two-thirds of the road
has been paved by Weber County, and the other part was
constructed by Weber County, and totally maintained by the
County since its existence. The Defendants themselves con·
sider this the County's obligation. Further, Jule Combe, Sr.
stated that he offered the road to the County in 1945, if they
would maintain same.
The evidence is conclusive by all witnesses that the
County has maintained the road since this offer was made.
It is undisputed that the James Farrell home, Plaintiffs' prior
owner, used 4600 South Street as access thereto since 1945,
even as admitted by Defendant Jule Combe, Sr. The usage
of the road, in providing access to residential property, has
not been changed to all by the Plaintiffs. It seems ironic,
that Defendant Jule Combe, Jr., who has only used the road
since 1961, now claims that he has the right to restrict the
use thereof, when less than 7 % of the entire road is located
on his land, and there have ben other rights of usage thereto, '
by the other owners for more than SO years.
If the other property owners demanded the same rights
that he claims, then he would not have access to his property.
It now appears that with the Forest Green Estates Subdivision, and Knollwood Estate Subdivision, there will be in
access of 200 homes that will use this road as an access to
their property. Further, the resolution passed by the Weber
County Commission, states as follows:
"NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby resolved and ordered
that the area of 4600 South Street, located in the unincorporated area of Weber County, Utah, as now platted
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in the records of the Weber County Recorder, be and the
same is hereby declared to be a county road, for the
benefit and use of the public, and that said area of road
shall continue to be maintained by Weber County.
Stated Jiarch 16, 1965.
Board of County Commissioners of Weber County.
State of Utah, by Bud Favero, Chairman.

A recent Utah decision is Bonner v Sudbury, cited in
417 P2d 646. This case concerned the public use of a deadend alley in Salt Lake City. Our Court held that where this
alley had been platted as a public street, paved and maintained
through the use of public funds, and where witnesses testified
that it had been used for more than 2S years by the public,
that these facts would constitute a dedication under 27-12-89
UCA 53. The court further stated that the resolution of this
issue cannot rest entirely upon what the owner says was his
intent.
In Clark v Erikson cited in 341 Pd 424 our Supreme
Court further held that where there was testimony that the
road had been used considerably in excess of 10 years, as a
short-cut to a fishing stream and by people going to church,
and with further reference being made to the road in the
deeds and abstracts, that this usage constituted a public dedication under this statute.

Another recent case 1s Joseph Boyer v Clifford Clark
cited in 326 P2d 107, where a road in Summit County crossed
approximately 1500 feet of the Defendant's property. The
testimony in that case established that the road had been
used for over SO years for hauling coal, crossing the open
range, driving cattle, sheep, etc. The landowner objecting to
public use had acquired his property approximately 12 years
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prior to the filing of the court action when he installed signs
thereafter and attempted to restrict its use. The Supreme
Court in reversing the trial court, held that there was sufficient evidence to establish public use under 27-12-89, even '
though this road had never been maintained at public expense
The court, in discussing the evidence and applicable law,
stated as follows:
"The uncontradicted evidence in the instant case disclosed that for a period exceeding 50 years, the public,
even though not consisting of a great many persons,
made a continuous and uninterrupted use of Middle Canyon Road in traveling by wagon and other vehicles and
by horse from Upton to Grass Creek and other points '
as often as they found it convenient or necessary. They
trailed cattle, and sheep, hauled coal, and used this trail
for other purposes in traveling Grass Creek and various
other points to and from Highway 133. This evidence
was sufficient as a matter of law to establish a highway
by dedication and the court erred in finding otherwise.
The highway once having been established by such use,
it is provided by statute, Sec. 27-1-3, U.C.A. 1953• t'itat
it"*** must continue to be highway(s) until abandoned
by order of the board of county commissioner * * * or
other competent authority." There is no contention that
any such procedure has been invoked here."
1

1

Another Utah statute, 27-12-92, also enacted in 1963 '
which was an exact re-statement of 27-1-10, originally enacted
m 1898, states as follows:
"PATENTEE AND COUNTY TO ASSERT CLAIMS
TO ROADS CROSS!l'v'G LAND - Whenever any person shall acquire title from the United States to any land
in this state over which there shall at the time extend
any public highway that shall not theretofore have been
dul y platted, and that shall not have been continuously
1

10

used as used for a period of ten years theretofore, he shall
within three months after receipt of his patent assert his
claim for damages in writing to the board of county comsioners of the county in which the land is situated; and
said board shall have an additional period of three months
in whirh to begin proceedings to condemn the land acrording to law. Such highway shall continue open as a
public highway during said periods; but in case no action
is begun by the board of county commissioners within
the period above stated, such highway shall be deemed
to be abandoned by the pubbic. In case of a failure by
such person so acquiring title to public lands to assert his
claim for damage as aforesaid for three months from the
time he shall have received a patent to such lands, he
shall thereafter be barred from asserting or recovering
any damages by reason of such public highway, and
the same shall remain open."
It is apparent from the wording of this statute that if a
patentee desire to contest the existence of any public highway
upon his property when the patent is issued, even though the
road shall not have been used for 10 years prior thereto, he
shall have 3 months after receipt of his patent to assert a
claim against the county commissioners for damages, and to
further require the condemnation of said road. If this action
is not asserted within said period, then he is forever barred
from asserting or recovering any damages, by reason of such
public highway and the same shall remain open.
It is clear from this statute and the evidence admitted at
the trial that Michael Combe, Defendants' predecessor in interest, had to assert his claim within 3 months after receiving
his patent or he would be forever barred from disputing the
public use thereof.
The testimony of witnesses indicated tthat this road was
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in existence and used by George Farrell, as the entrance to
his home, as he homesteaded Section 15 and received the .
patent thereto, as did Michael Combe to Section 10.
I

Another applicable federal statute is 43 USCA 93 2, which \
i
states as follows:
"RIGHT-OF-WAY FOR HIGHWAYS. The right-of- i
way for the construction of highways, not reserved for :
the public uses, is hereby granted."
1

A case construing this statute is Van Wanning v Deter,
cited in 112 NW 902.
"A settler on public lands on which there is a road in
comrmon use as a public highway takes subject to the
public easement of such, as a road though it was never
established by the public authorities under the general
road laws."

Another Utah case is Morris v Blunt cited in 161 P 1127,
where the Court held as follows:

I
1

I
I

"Under this section, the highway, even though it be over
privately owned ground, will be deemed dedicated or
abandoned to the public use when the public has con- .
tinuously used it as a thoroughfare for a period of ten
years, but such use must be by the public."

I
1

Another recent Utah case is Gillmor v Carter cited in
391 P2d 426, where the Court held as follows:
"In order for a private road to become a public thoroughfare there must be evidence of intent by the owner to
vacate the road to a public use and an acceptance by the
public. Such intent may be inferred from the decorations,
acts or circumstances and uses by the general public."

Regarding the resolution passed by the Weber County
12
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Commission in March of 1965, this authority would seem to
be inferred from Utah Statute 17-5-42, which states as follows:
"REGV LA TIO NS OF USE OF ROADS. They may
enact ordinances and make regulations not in conflict of
law for tlte control, construction, alteration, repair and
use of all roads and highways in the county outside of
incorporated cities."

It further appears from the statement issued by the
Weber County Surveyor's office that there has been continual
use of 4600 South Street for more than ten years, and further
shows their opinion regarding public dedication.
CONCLUSION
Most of the cases cited by appellants in their brief in
the lower Court, were decisions that were rendered before the
advent of the automobile. The photographs, that were admitted in evidence, also show the extensive usage of this road.
Further, the testimony of the tenant of the Farrell home,
showing his occupancy since 1940 and the use of the road to
get to his home, which is undisputed, shows a minimum of 27
years of unrestricted use. Where it is the intention of the
Plaintiffs to just use the road for access to residential property, as it has been so used in excess of 2 7 years, then there
is no change of usage thereof. It is respectfully submitted
that the lower Court judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
KEITH E. MURRAY
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